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Abstract 
 
This thesis has two main purposes. The first is to analyze the effects of global 
airline alliances on those affected by them: the consumers, the allied airlines, the non-
allied airlines and the airports. The second purpose is to integrate the changes that have 
been occurring in the airport-airline relationship into the alliances literature, thus 
analyzing global alliances from a new perspective.  
Arguments that support the theory of loss of bargaining power by airports were 
found. This realization raised the need to develop an econometric model in order to assess 
the factors that might facilitate the monopolization of an airport by an alliance. The 
sample consisted of 60 hub airports of alliances’ members. 
Six out of ten variables were found to be statistically significant. The model 
presents negative relationships between the dependent variable and the market share of 
the other alliances, the percentage of domestic and inter-regional flights, the airports’ 
concentration, the market share of low-cost carriers and the existence of a secondary 
airport.  
 
 
 
JEL codes: D740, K210, M190  
Key words: Competition, Strategy, Alliances, Aviation 
  
v 
 
Index of Contents 
 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1. Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 4 
1.1 The beginning of international airline alliances ................................................. 4 
1.2 Consequences for consumers ............................................................................. 5 
1.3 Consequences for allied airlines ......................................................................... 6 
1.4 Consequences for non-allied airlines ................................................................. 8 
1.5 The shift in the airport-airline relationship and consequences for airports ........ 8 
2. Airline Alliances and Airports: Methodology ............................................................ 11 
3. Airline Alliances and Airports: Part One .................................................................... 12 
3.1 Data Gathering Procedures .............................................................................. 12 
3.2 Analysis ............................................................................................................ 14 
4. Airline Alliances and Airports: Part Two ................................................................... 18 
4.1 Data gathering procedures ................................................................................ 18 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................ 22 
4.4 Econometric Estimation ................................................................................... 24 
4.5 Alternative Econometric Specification ............................................................ 28 
4.6 Parameter stability ............................................................................................ 32 
5. Airports’ Response Strategies ..................................................................................... 35 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 38 
Appendix 1: Gujarati Method ......................................................................................... 40 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 42 
Annex 1: Alliances’ Members ........................................................................................ 45 
Annex 2: Aircrafts .......................................................................................................... 46 
Annex 3: Airports and Hub Airlines ............................................................................... 49 
 
  
vi 
 
Index of Tables 
 
Table 1 Data for major global alliances 2014 ................................................................... 5 
Table 2  PLF by airline categories in March 2015 (IATA, 2015a) ................................. 14 
Table 3 Airline Alliances and Airports - Part One .......................................................... 16 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics: Model 1 .......................................................................... 23 
Table 5 Coefficients for the regression model: Model 1 ................................................. 25 
Table 6 Correlations matrix: Model 1 ............................................................................. 26 
Table 7 Correlations matrix: Model 2 ............................................................................. 29 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics: Model 2 .......................................................................... 30 
Table 9 Coefficients for the regression model: Model 2 ................................................. 31 
Table 10 F-Statistics for Gujarati Method ....................................................................... 32 
Table 11 Coefficients for the regression model after Gujarati Method .......................... 33 
1 
 
 Introduction 
 
The importance of air transportation is unquestionable. Air transportation drives 
economic and social progress by connecting people and countries, generating trade and 
tourism and forging links between developed and developing countries. The rapid 
transportation system is essential for global business and tourism and has a total global 
economic impact of $2.4 trillion through direct and indirect effects (IATA, 2015b). 
In 2014 3.3 billion passengers and 51.7 million tons of cargo were transported by 
air. The aviation business creates directly 8.7 million jobs worldwide and supports an 
additional 49.4 million jobs indirectly.  
For being so undeniably important, the air transport business is abundantly 
examined and all aviation trends and strategies are amply discussed. 
The rise of the tendency for airlines to organize themselves in global alliances let 
to a debate comparing the benefits presented by the allied alliances to the possible 
negative impacts. Wang (2014) defined global airline alliances as “bilateral or multilateral 
agreements in which the allied airlines share similar business objectives and they 
coordinate their services to achieve their common goals”. Although the international 
alliances were constituted between 1997 and 2000, this theme continues to generate a 
heated discussion. In June 2015, the un-allied American airline JetBlue’s Senior Vice 
President Robert Land called for a review of airline alliances, arguing that “left 
unchecked, this U.S. government-sanctioned collusion will continue to stifle innovation 
and competition in international aviation”. 
Given the stated importance of the sector and the impact of this strategy, 
international airline alliances have been thoroughly studied from several perspectives, 
with each author giving special attention to a determined perspective. 
Two branches of literature are related to the subject of this thesis. 
The first branch aims at balancing the effects of global airline alliances on those 
who are affected by them: the consumers, the allied airlines, the non-allied airlines and 
the airports. This will allows for an integrated view of the impact caused by alliances in 
the aviation industry, which constitute the first purpose of this thesis. It is important to 
stress that this thesis focuses only on the three international airline alliances: oneworld, 
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SkyTeam and Star Alliance. Besides these global alliances, there are others with 
national and regional focus, of which the Arab Air Carriers Organization is an 
example.  
The second branch of literature explores the evolving airline-airport 
relationship. Along with the tendency for global alliances, the aviation industry 
has also been witnessing profound changes in the airport-airline relationship. 
There have been two main catalysts of change. The first is the liberalization of the 
market, which contributed to the rise of low-cost carriers and modified the 
business model of traditional carriers, thus altering the competition dynamics. The 
second is the privatization of airports, leading to a more commercial management 
with focus on profits, rather than the well-far optimizing perspective adopted by 
public management. The new market dynamics resulted in a substantial decrease 
of the bargaining power of airports when negotiating with airlines. 
The contribution of this thesis is the intersection of the two branches of 
literature. While the subject of the decreasing bargaining power of airports has 
already been studied by authors such as Starkie (2012), Polk and Bilotkach (2013) 
and Bush and Starkie (2014), the integration of this matter in the context of global 
alliances has not been pursued yet. 
This justifies the research question: what is the impact of international 
airline alliances on the airport-airline relationship? This matter represents a new 
angle of study of global airline alliances and represents the second purpose of this 
thesis.  
The realization of the loss of bargaining power leads to a need to analyze 
alliances’ market power in hub airports and to assess the factors that facilitate the 
monopolization of an airport by an alliance. Allied airlines follow a hub-and-
spoke network, where most of the routes operated by the airline have as origin or 
destination the same central airport, around which the company organizes all its 
operation. Consequently, the allied airlines’ hub airports will be the most affected. 
The analysis will be conducted in two parts. Part One consist of a simple analysis 
of seven airports, whereas in Part Two an econometric model will be developed.  
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, a literature review will 
be carried out, where it will be analyzed the rise of global airline alliances and its 
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consequences for consumers, allied airlines, non-allied airlines and airports. The 
methodology is exposed in Chapter 2. The first part of the analysis is conducted in 
Chapter 3, while the second part, the econometric model, follows in Chapter 4. An 
analysis of the airports’ reaction to the loss of bargaining power will be exposed in 
Chapter 5. Conclusions are drawn in the last chapter.  
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1. Literature Review  
 
1.1 The beginning of international airline alliances 
The worldwide deregulation of the aviation industry started in the United 
States in the 1970s, shifting the competition in this industry. A substantial part of 
this shift occurred when airlines realized that most consumers prefer to travel with 
an airline which has an extensive international network (Park, 1997).  
The perception of this preference, and the comprehension that an airline 
could not be truly global, led companies to join in airline alliances. According to 
Wang (2014), global airline alliances are “bilateral or multilateral agreements in 
which the allied airlines1 share similar business objectives and they coordinate 
their services to achieve their common goals”. So, a global airline alliance 
represents “cooperation and integration of the international airline services”, so 
that an airline can achieve a network that could not reach through organic growth.  
The need to increase networks through alliances was justified by the flying 
restrictions felt in many countries. The primary event with the objective of 
coordinating international aviation was the Chicago Convention on International 
Civil Aviation in 1944. This gave rise to the celebration of bilateral agreements, 
in which two countries agreed upon the gateway airports available to enter the 
territory, restricted the entry of airlines and shared the traffic, thus leading to 
severe restrictions in air travel (Button and Stough, 2000). According to Park 
(1997) and Wu and Lee (2014), alliances allowed airlines to access markets and 
resources in which would not be legally possible or economically viable to do so, 
due to geographical and regulatory constraints. Button and Stough (2000) argued 
that by allowing airlines to “access markets to which they have no direct legal 
access”, alliances present a solution to achieve complete international air transport 
networks, thus being able to provide global coverage with lower resources than 
would be able to on their own. 
                                                     
1 Several denominations are found for these airlines in the reviewed literature. These are, among others, 
legacy carrier, national airline, network airline and full-service carrier. During the course of the thesis, 
allied airlines and network airlines will be the denominations used.  
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Other motives are mentioned for the creation of airline alliances. Morrish and 
Hamilton (2002) argued that alliances are justified by the low-profit margins of the 
industry, thus acting as a strategy to improve performance. In more specific terms, 
Morrish and Hamilton (2002) added other possible reasons for the formation of alliances 
such as cost savings, market penetration and retention and financial injections. 
Furthermore, Wang (2014) stated that an alliance acts as a service enhancement and 
enrichment, allowing traditional carriers to differentiate from low cost carriers. 
Nowadays, there are three major global alliances in the aviation industry: 
oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance (Table 1)2. According to Wang (2014), the three 
alliances accounted for 77% of the world airline capacity in 2013.  
 
 Star Alliance SkyTeam oneworld 
 27 Members 20 Members 15 Members 
 Founded 1997 Founded 2000 Founded 1999 
Passengers (millions) 654 612 513 
Countries 193 177 155 
Destinations 1321 1052 1010 
Table 1 Data for major global alliances 2014 
  
1.2 Consequences for consumers 
Several benefits have been identified as results of the creation of alliances.  
The extension of the airlines’ network benefits consumers because they can now 
easily travel to countries where it would not be as easy to do so, as stated by Park (1997). 
For Button and Stough (2000), larger networks enables airlines to offer a larger range of 
destinations and provide greater frequency.  
The integration of airlines in alliances also allows for a better coordination of 
flights, which decreases transfer times and enables one-stop check-in, joint baggage 
handling and the harmonization of Frequent Flyer Programs. Some airports, for example 
the Narita International Airport3 (Japan), have reorganized their operations in order to 
concentrate the alliances’ flights in one terminal, allowing consumers to harvest the 
                                                     
2 The full list of alliances’ members can be found in annex 1. 
3 Information retrieved from the airport’s website. 
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benefits of better coordination. Wu and Lee (2014) found operational and financial 
merits of the process of reorganization of airports’ operations in order to achieve 
alliance terminal co-location, defined as an “airline-side effort to strengthen 
connectivity and streamline asset utilization in hub airports”.  
Although not undoubtedly concluded, some studies have provided 
evidences of decrease of tariffs. (Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Morrish and 
Hamilton, 2002). Goetz and Shapiro (2012) stated that the joint selling of flights 
by different companies eliminates the double-marginalization4 problem. 
An indirect benefit of alliances to consumers is the promotion of corporate 
social responsibility programs. Oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance promote 
humanitarian programs, providing transport of workers, supplies and equipment 
to victims of natural disasters, and environmental programs, targeting the decrease 
of carbon emissions. Steven and Merklein (2013) found evidence of 
environmental benefits of strategic alliances due to the cancellation of unneeded 
flights, the joint use of airport facilities, the pooling of technical and 
environmental know-how and the joint procurement of modern aircraft. This 
brings better carbon intensity, increased system efficiency, reduction of waste and 
better fuel efficiency.  
Although receiving several benefits from the formation of alliances, the 
decrease in competition can bring negative effects for consumers. Analyzing the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI)5 before and after alliances, Pitfield (2007) 
concluded that there is a substantial increase in the industry concentration, which 
is a recognized driver for anticompetitive effects (Motta, 2004), therefore alliances 
may lead to a decrease in consumer welfare.  
 
1.3 Consequences for allied airlines 
The airlines joining alliances benefit greatly.  
                                                     
4 Double marginalization is defined as the exercise of market power of successive players in a supply chain 
that leads to a higher price than the price that would arise if the firms were vertically integrated. 
5 The HHI is a measure of market concentration that takes into account the relative size distribution of the 
firms in a market. The HHI increases both as the number of firms decreases and as the disparity in size 
between the firms increase.  
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The coordination of activities enables cost reduction, as stated by Park (1997) and 
Wang (2014). This reduction is a consequence of sharing ground facilities such as 
lounges, gates and check-in counters, the exchange of flight attendants and joint 
marketing and promotion activities.  
The performance is also improved by the productivity gains obtained, as shown 
by Park (1997), Morrish & Hamilton (2002), Oum et al. (2004) and Wang (2014). The 
network effects are amplified, especially for corporate deals and members of Frequent 
Flyer Programs, since an airline can now be chosen solely for its participation in an 
alliance, as concluded by the European Competition Authority Air Traffic Working 
Group (2003).  
A survey of airlines participating in an alliance showed that an increase in 
passenger traffic occurred mainly in hub-to-hub and hub-to-non-hub routes (Wu and Lee, 
2014).  Button and Stough (2000) stated that savings come from “attracting more traffic 
rather than expanding the network to cover additional origin/destinations” and that 
alliances allow carriers to enter new markets with little investment. Productivity gains are 
also derived from the possibility of using larger aircraft due to the increase in traffic, that 
present lower cost per available seat kilometer. 
Wang (2014) showed that membership in an alliance acts as a “service 
enhancement and enrichment” that can impact positively the brand awareness and 
recognition, which will eventually affect the consumers’ preference and purchase 
intention. Consequently, by joining an alliance, airlines will see their brand improved.  
The integration in an alliance allows an airline to coordinate “procurement and 
investment activities (…) on the purchase of fuel, equipment and aircraft”, thus increasing 
the market power in negotiations with manufacturers (Steven and Merklein, 2013).  
The bargaining power in negotiations with airports will also improve, as will be 
discussed ahead.  
In general, airline alliances, combined with the use of hub-and-spoke networks, 
represent a “means of exploiting economies of scale, density and scope in the provision 
of services and as a means to exploit economies of market presence in terms of patronage” 
(Button and Stough, 2000). However, airlines must be careful when joining an alliance, 
since an inadequate choice or lack of commitment may lead to an absence of strategic and 
cultural fit, as concluded by Huettinger (2013). Tight collaboration and an extensive 
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learning process were shown to be crucial to the success of the alliance. The 
integration in an alliance implies high expenditures to the airlines, and its failure 
might entail substantial costs for the airlines. 
 
1.4 Consequences for non-allied airlines 
As stated by Morrish and Hamilton (2002), “airlines that do not enter into 
alliances will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, unable to generate 
traffic from their alliance competitors”. Alliances will impose negative 
externalities in non-participants, since the traffic and performance gains for 
participants will be mainly at the expense of non-participants.  
Goetz and Shapiro (2012) and Polk and Bilotkach (2013) argued that the 
coordination of Frequent Flyer Programs among the alliance members will raise 
consumers’ switching costs. This will difficult the attraction of new costumers, 
since they are locked in the alliance and have few incentives to change to a non-
allied airline.  
Studies have shown that some agreements between airlines may have the 
specific objective to deter entrance in a certain market. Evidences of alliances 
being used as means to discourage entrance were found by Goetz and Shapiro 
(2012) that showed that the probability to enter a codesharing agreement in a 
specific segment is 25% more likely when that segment is threatened by a low-
cost competitor. As a non-participant, an airline can have difficulty entering a new 
market because of the strategic agreements made by the incumbents.  
By increasing their bargaining power in negotiations with airports, airlines 
participating in alliances may create entry barriers in specific airports, further 
enhancing the difficulty of non-allied airlines to enter new markets. 
 
1.5 The shift in the airport-airline relationship and consequences 
for airports 
In order to better understand the consequences of global airline alliances 
for airports, it is crucial to comprehend the changes in the aviation industry.  
Airport have always been seen as the providers of a monopoly service, in 
which they have significant market power. Being capital intensive, it would be 
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inefficient to have more than one firm providing airport services. So, this structure makes 
airports not only monopolies but natural monopolies, as stated by Starkie (2012). Until 
recently, most airports were owned by the state and this structure of ownership removed 
all possibility of exploitation of dominant position. However, a tendency for the 
privatization of the main airports has been seen in the last 25 years, leading to many recent 
studies analyzing the need for airport regulation since a change from ownership by central 
government to the private sector raises the need to prevent monopolistic behavior 
(Starkie, 2012; Polk and Bilotkach, 2013; Bush and Starkie, 2014).  
What all these studies have found is that a noticeable change in airport-airline 
relationship has been occurring that has removed the need for regulation. Even as 
monopolies, airport do not possess significant market power, and the power they had, 
they have been losing it with the new market dynamics. This raises the question: what 
has been weakening airport’s market power? 
The new market dynamics give airlines more flexibility. In a point-to-point 
network6, the airline are not locked in to a particular airport, allowing them to seek the 
best financial return (Starkie, 2012), shifting their routes if the airport raises the 
aeronautical charges. The competition between airports substantially increases since they 
are trying to secure airlines. This flexibility is enhanced by the key role of internet as a 
way to communicate changes in routes at little or no cost, leading Starkie (2012) to label 
internet as a catalyst of change. In a hub-and-spoke network, there is an “inter-dependence 
between the airline and the airport”, as said by Polk and Bilotkach (2013). This inter-
dependence is however being questioned with the adoption of multihub systems that gives 
the airlines the option and the credible threat to switch business between the multiple hub 
airports, thus further increasing competition between airports. The increase in 
competition led to the need to decrease aeronautical charges, thus forcing airports to 
search for new revenue possibilities. As a result, airports started to depend more on 
commercial revenues, leading to investments in the expansion of the airports’ services 
and facilities (Button and Stough, 2000). Cross-subsidization7 is starting to occur in 
airports as a way to keep landing fees low.  
                                                     
6 In a point-to-point network, the airline travels directly to the destination, without transfers. 
7 Cross-subsidization occurs when the low prices of a certain product are supported by the profits generated 
by another product. 
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Along with the increase in airlines’ flexibility, other factors have been 
questioning airports’ market power. Intermodal competition has been increasing, 
since the development of faster solutions in rail transport, for example high speed 
trains, also threats airports since they become viable substitutes to short-haul 
flights. Airport assets represent substantial sunk costs and also, as Starkie (2012) 
pointed out, they “have a high degree of specificity”, thus limiting “opportunities 
for using assets outside of the aviation domain”, deepening the need for 
cooperation with airlines.  
As shown, several studies stress the changes felt in the aviation industry 
that led to the decrease of airports’ market power over airlines. However, 
nowadays most airlines are, as discussed above, organized in alliances. What are 
the consequences of these organizations for the airport’s market power? 
The European Competition Authorities Air Traffic Working Group (2003) 
stated that mergers restrict competition in routes between hubs since they make 
the hub airports less attractive to competitors. If we are dealing with an alliance, 
we are dealing with more routes between hubs, thus impacting more routes and 
airports. So, it is to expect that the impact is greater in alliances than in mergers.  
Polk and Bilotkach (2013) argued that a “dehubbing event might lead to 
curtailment of services by the hub operator’s partner airlines, as they are no longer 
able to feed connecting traffic to the hub airport”. So, it is to expect that the hub 
airport’s market power might suffer substantially when its captive airline enters 
an alliance. Since the major part of airlines acting in a point-to-point system are 
low cost carriers, and considering that these airline typically do not enter in global 
airline alliances, airports that are part of these systems are not as susceptible to 
suffer a decrease of market power as are the ones part of a hub-and-spoke system.  
As found by Goetz and Shapiro (2012), agreements between airlines may 
have the objective to deter entrance in a certain market. Therefore, alliances might 
difficult the attraction of new airlines by airports, further deepening the 
dependence in the hub airline. 
As Polk and Bilotkach (2013) stated, “the larger the carrier, the better its 
position in the airport-airline bargaining relationships”. If a large carrier can 
question an airport bargaining power, what will be the power of an alliance?  
11 
 
2. Airline Alliances and Airports: Methodology 
 
The airline industry is a mature industry, with many competitors with a high 
degree of rivalry between them. The dynamics that characterize this industry were altered 
with the creation of international airline alliances. So far, the airline industry was analyzed 
at a global level in order to better comprehend the implications of the creation of airline 
alliances.  
Airports constitute a key element of this industry, since they are the means through 
which airlines develop their business. The changes in the relationship of interdependence 
between airports and airlines have been caused mainly by the new market dynamics in 
this industry. The airports that are most affected are the hub airports of the allied airlines. 
Arguments were presented that the hub airports’ bargaining power can now be threaten 
by an alliance’s excessive market power.  
This raises the need to analyze the alliances’ market shares in hub airports. With 
that goal, seven airports were studied in order to understand how disperse are the 
alliances’ market shares, which constitutes the first part of the analysis.  
The conclusions retrieved from the first analysis led to a question that will be 
answered by the second analysis: Are there factors that facilitate the monopolization of 
an airport by an alliance?   
This question will be answered by an empirical model, using a linear regression 
model estimated by ordinary least squares. Econometrics were chosen as methodology 
since it concerns “the development of appropriate methods for measuring economic 
relationships” (Gujarati, 2004). In this specific case, the relationship between the chosen 
variables and the alliance’s market share is targeted.  
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3. Airline Alliances and Airports: Part One 
 
3.1 Data Gathering Procedures 
The first part of the analysis is, as mentioned, a simple study of the 
alliances’ market share in seven airports. The study will be based on airport-based 
data from February 2015.  
Airports’ flights data have been obtained from FlightStats, a “leading 
publisher of real-time global flight and airport information” (FlightStats’ 
website)8, which collects information regarding each flight arriving and departing 
from all airports. FlightStats provides data concerning the origin, destination, 
airline, arrival and departure time, aircraft used and codeshares in each flight. 
Since it was decided to conduct this analysis from the perspective of an external 
agent, it is stressed out that the quality of the data depends solely on the reliability 
of the chosen source. 
As mentioned, the analysis will focus on seven airports: four European, 
two American and one Asian. The airports were chosen according to the number 
of passengers enplaned and deplaned, information provided by the Airports 
Council International (2014) regarding annual traffic data of 2013. The selected 
airports were the busiest in its region, respecting the number of airports per region 
presented above. The airports are London Heathrow Airport (England), Paris 
Charles de Gaulle Airport (France), Frankfurt Airport (Germany), Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol (Netherlands), Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport 
(United Stated of America), Chicago O’Hare Airport (United States of America) 
and Beijing Capital International Airport (China).  
Airline’s airport dominance will be defined as suggested by Ciliberto and 
Williams (2010), as “the percentage of passengers flying on one airline at an 
airport”. From this definition, it is possible to generalize in order to define 
alliance’s airport dominance as the percentage of passengers flying on one alliance 
at an airport. The importance of considering the percentage of passengers instead 
of percentage of flights is stressed by several authors. As stated by D’Alfonso and 
                                                     
8 The information was not retrieved by the use of any screen scraping software and has no objective of 
commercial exploitation. 
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Nastasi (2014), “commercial operations tend to be more profitable than aeronautical 
operations. (…) The aeronautical charge may be reduced so as to induce a higher volume 
of passengers and increase the demand for concessions”. Given the low margins of the 
aeronautical charges and comparing to the high margins of the commercial operations 
that led to incentives to increase the number of passengers (even reaching a situation of 
cross-subsidization), it is obvious that airports are now giving great importance to the 
number of passengers.  
An airline’s market share will therefore be the ratio between the number of 
passengers travelling in the airline i in the airport k in February 2015 and the total number 
of passengers in the airports k in February 2015, as described above. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑘 =
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘
  
 
The number of passengers travelling in each airline will be based in the aircraft 
used in that flight. The capacity of each aircraft was determined by the standard capacity 
defined by the constructor9. This will give us the Available Seat Kilometers (ASK), 
defined by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) as the available passenger 
capacity. However, not all flights have full occupancy.  
This raises the need to consider the Passenger Load Factor (PLF), defined by 
IATA as the percentage of ASKs used. The PLF considered for the measure of passengers 
travelling in a certain airline will be based on data provided by IATA for March 2015, 
which can be found in Table 2. The airlines’ PLF was divided by IATA into six categories 
according to the region in which the airlines take part: Asia-Pacific, Europe, North 
America, Middle East, Latin America and Africa. A seventh category was created to 
define cargo carriers as transporting zero passengers, hence not having any interest in the 
context of this study. A limitation of the definition of these categories is the lack of 
distinction between network and low-cost carriers, since having higher load factors is an 
argument used by low-cost carriers to justify the ability to practice lower prices than 
network airlines. Another limitation is the lack of distinction between allied and non-
allied airlines. Steven and Merklein (2013) stated that managers of global alliances 
                                                     
9 The list of aircrafts used and the capacities of each can be found in annex 2. 
(3.1) 
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members comproved that “membership in a strategic alliance resulted in an 
increase of load factors”. However, since no source gave actual figures for these 
distinctions, the IATA’s PLFs will be applied.  
 
Category 
PLF 
International 
Flights 
(A) 
% 
International 
Flights 
(B) 
PLF 
Domestic 
Flights 
(C) 
% 
Domestic 
Flights 
(D) 
Load Factor 
(A) *(B) + (C) * (D) 
Asia-Pacific 78,50% 56,00% 82,00% 44,00% 80,04% 
Europe 80,80% 89,00% 82,00% 11,00% 80,93% 
North America 80,40% 33,00% 82,00% 67,00% 81,47% 
Middle East 77,10% 95,00% 82,00% 5,00% 77,35% 
Latin America 77,40% 53,00% 82,00% 47,00% 79,56% 
Africa 65,70% 86,00% 82,00% 14,00% 67,98% 
Cargo 0,00%  0,00%  0,00% 
Table 2  PLF by airline categories in March 2015 (IATA, 2015a) 
 
3.2 Analysis 
As said before, the Part One of the analysis will focus on seven airports. 
There are four European (Frankfurt, Heathrow, Amsterdam and Paris), two 
American (Atlanta and Chicago) and one Asian (Beijing). In terms of alliances, 
there are three cases in which the hub alliance is Star Alliance, three from Skyteam 
and one from oneworld. The airports will be studied case by case. (Table 3) 
Frankfurt Airport is dominated by Lufthansa, which is a founding member 
of Star Alliance and accounts for 66,21% of passengers in this airport. Other 
airlines from Star Alliance transport 12,79% of passengers, leading to a total 
alliance share of 79,00%. This contrasts with a market share of 4,84% and 5,58% 
for SkyTeam and oneworld, respectively.  
London Heathrow Airport has 59,82% of its passengers travelling with 
oneworld, the alliance in which British Airways, its hub airline10, participates and 
from which is founding member. Only 6,91% travel from others oneworld’s 
                                                     
10 The denomination hub airline is used to designate the airline that has the biggest market share in the 
analyzed airport. The denomination hub alliance will be used to define the alliance in which the hub airline 
participates. 
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members. Even though SkyTeam has only 5,27% market share, Star Alliance has 17,68%, 
thus having a reasonable presence.  
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is the hub airport for KLM. KLM, which is a 
member of SkyTeam since 2004, transports 49,45% of passengers. SkyTeam transports a 
total of 61,29%, leaving 11,84% of passengers to be transported by other carriers from 
the alliance. Other alliances transport only 8,05% (Star Alliance) and 5,18% (oneworld). 
Amsterdam Airport has 15,70% of passengers travelling from low-costs carriers.  
Air France dominates Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport with a market share of 
52,01%. Air France is a founding member of SkyTeam, which transports 62,70% of 
passengers travelling from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, with other carriers being 
responsible for 10,69%. Star Alliance and oneworld only transport 10,61% and 6,69%, 
respectively. 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, the airport with more passengers 
enplaned and deplaned in 2013, is the hub airport for Delta Air Lines. Delta Air Lines is 
also a founding member of SkyTeam and has a market share of 80,55%. Other carriers in 
SkyTeam only account for 0,90% of passengers. Other alliances also have an insignificant 
market share with 2,00% (oneworld) and 1,93% (Star Alliance). Atlanta Airport exhibits 
very high concentration, with a value of 0,66 in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
Chicago O’Hare Airport is dominated by United Airlines, which represents 
40,89% of passengers. Star Alliance, the alliance from which United Airlines is a 
founding member, transports 44,16%, meaning that other carriers from the alliance only 
amount to 3,27%. Even though United Airlines is the main airline in Chicago O’Hare 
Airport, American Airlines also has a substantial market share, transporting 33,96% of 
all passengers and implying a high market share for oneworld (35,65%). SkyTeam 
represents only 5,71%.  
Air China dominates Beijing Capital International Airport with 40,30% market 
share. Star Alliance, the organization in which Air China participates since 2007, 
transports 46,26% of passengers travelling from Beijing Airport. SkyTeam also holds 
significant market share, representing 31,16%. This is justified by the moderate presence 
of China Eastern Airlines (12,32%) and China Southern Airlines (15,10%), both members 
of SkyTeam. Oneworld transports only 1,71% of passengers. Beijing Airport has a level 
of 0,21 of concentration, thus not having high concentration, only moderate. 
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Comparing the seven airports, it is obvious that several differences can be 
identified. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is the airport with 
highest market share for the hub alliance (81,45%), whereas Chicago O’Hare 
Airport is the one with the lowest (44,16%). Although Atlanta is also the airport 
with the highest market share of the hub airline (Delta Air Lines with 80,55%), 
Chicago is not the airport with the lowest. That is the case of Beijing Capital 
International Airport where Air China only transports 40,30%. 
 
Table 3 Airline Alliances and Airports - Part One 
 
Frankfurt Airport has the highest market share of the alliance without the 
hub airline, which in this case means Star Alliance without Lufthansa (12,79%), 
whereas Atlanta Airport has the lowest with only 0,90%. 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is the airport with the highest market share 
for low-cost carriers with 15,70%, whereas Beijing Capital International Airport 
has the lowest market share, only 0,32%. 
In terms of concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
Atlanta Airport has the highest concentration with 0,66, while Beijing Capital 
International Airport is the least concentrated with 0,21. Taking into consideration 
that values above 0,25 are considered as highly concentrated by Competition 
 Frankfurt Heathrow Amsterdam Paris Atlanta Chicago Beijing 
Star Alliance 79,00% 17,68% 8,05% 10,61% 1,93% 44,16% 46,26% 
SkyTeam 4,84% 5,27% 61,29% 62,70% 81,45% 5,71% 31,16% 
oneworld 5,58% 59,82% 5,18% 6,69% 2,00% 35,65% 1,71% 
None 10,13% 15,35% 9,79% 10,79% 2,95% 9,12% 20,55% 
Low-cost 0,44% 1,88% 15,70% 9,20% 11,66% 5,36% 0,32% 
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
 
 Lufthansa 
British 
Airways 
KLM Air France 
Delta Air 
Lines 
United 
Airlines 
Air China 
Hub Airline 66,21% 52,91% 49,45% 52,01% 80,55% 40,89% 40,30% 
Alliance without 
Hub Airline 
12,79% 6,91% 11,84% 10,69% 0,90% 3,27% 5,96% 
HHI 0,44 0,29 0,26 0,28 0,66 0,29 0,21 
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Authorities, almost all analyzed airports present high levels of concentration. Beijing 
Airport is the exception, exhibiting a moderate concentration of 0,21.  
So, this raises the question: Are there factors that facilitate the monopolization of 
an airport by an alliance?  
What factors justify higher market shares of the hub alliances? What is the 
relationship between the market share of the hub alliance and the hub airline market 
share? And the share of low-cost carriers? And the market share of other alliances? These 
relationships and many others can be studied by resorting to an econometric model, which 
constitutes the Part Two of the analysis.  
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4. Airline Alliances and Airports: Part Two 
 
Arguments were presented that justify a loss of bargaining power by 
airports due to the creation of international strategic alliances. The Part One of the 
analysis showed that the market share of the hub alliance is not only related to the 
market share of the hub airline. This creates a need to assess whether there are 
factors that facilitate the monopolization of an airport by an alliance, consequently 
decreasing the airports’ bargaining power. That will be achieved recurring to an 
econometric model.  
 
4.1 Data gathering procedures 
The empirical analysis draws on airport-based data of the target airports 
from the first to the seventh of March 2015. An airline’s market share will 
therefore be measured as the ratio between the number of passengers travelling in 
airline i in airport k in the first week of March 2015 and the total number of 
passengers in the airport k in the first week of March 2015, as was earlier described 
in equation 3.1. There are two major limitations of the data. The first in the 
inability to capture monthly and seasonal tendencies. The second is the low 
number of observations that can lead to the distortion of the results. However, this 
limitation can only be overcome with the increase of the number of airlines 
participating in alliances.  
Flights data have been obtained from FlightStats, as was done in Part One. 
The airports analyzed are the hub airports of the carriers participating in 
oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance. When an airport is hub for more than one 
company, it will only be considered once, as the hub of the airline with highest 
market share in that airport. It will only be considered situations where the main 
alliance has at least 35% market share. The establishment of this limit has the only 
objective to eliminate situations where the market share is too disperse. 11 
Therefore, the model has 60 observations. 
                                                     
11 The full list of airport-airline pairs can be found in annex 3. 
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For the reasons stated in Chapter 3.1, alliance’s airport dominance will be defined 
as the percentage of passengers flying on one alliance at an airport. The number of 
passengers travelling in each company will be measured by the same criteria as Part One. 
The limitations related to the considered load factors identified before also apply to the 
empirical model.  
 
4.2 Econometric Specification 
In order to identify the determinants of the alliances’ airport dominance, a linear 
regression model was developed. The objective is to analyze the impact of several 
variables in the alliances’ market shares. To this end, the following equation will be 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS method): 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
=  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽4 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖
+ 𝜇𝑖 
 
In this equation, the dependent variable is the market share of the dominant 
alliance on airport i. The model has eleven independent variables.  
The market share of the hub airline is the first variable. The effect of this variable 
is expected to be positive, since “to take advantage of each other’s network coverage, 
alliance hubs have emerged at major airports where members airlines’ services are 
heavily concentrated” (Wu and Lee, 2014). This suggests that a higher market share of 
the hub airline will attract more members of the alliance wanting to take advantage of that 
network coverage, leading to a higher market share of the hub alliance. 
The average of the market share of the other two alliances is considered in the 
second variable. When the market share of other alliances is higher, the share of the hub 
alliance is lower. Therefore, the effect is expected to be negative. 
A dummy variable is used to determine whether or not the hub airline has an 
airline-within-airline (AinA) strategy. An AinA strategy consists in the creation of a 
(4.1) 
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subsidiary that is typically a low-cost or regional division. While studies revealed 
the failure of many low-cost divisions of network carriers, the regional 
subsidiaries are used to “serve short low-density routes that are most efficiently 
served by a small number of daily lights on small aircrafts as they feed passengers 
into the legacy carriers network”, as stated by Gillen et al. (2015), and do not 
present such failure rates. Homsombat et al. (2014) added that the AinA strategy 
“allowed them [the network airlines] to maintain the majority market shares in 
most markets, especially trans-continental long-distance routes”. For this reason, 
the effect of the presence of an AinA strategy is predicted to be positive.  
The number of codeshares per flight is also considered in the model. This 
variable is calculated by the average of codeshares in each flight. The outcome of 
this variable is uncertain since two opposite effects might occur. By codesharing 
with a partner, an airline can expand the network coverage, thus creating a positive 
effect. However, there can exist reduction of the frequencies of flights from that 
agreement since they may choose to codeshare instead of scheduling a different 
flight, resulting in a negative effect. The result is consequently uncertain. 
The fifth explanatory variable is the percentage of domestic flights. As 
suggested above, short- and medium-haul flights are usually served by regional or 
low-cost airlines, aiming to connect smaller communities with larger cities (Gillen 
et al., 2015). These flights are typically domestic. Since regional and low-cost 
airlines do not participate in international airline alliances, this variable is 
expected to have a negative effect.  
Whereas regional and low-cost airlines provide short- and medium-haul 
flights, network carriers are usually responsible for long-haul intercontinental 
flights. So, it is to expect that a higher percentage of intercontinental flights 
corresponds to a higher market share of the network airlines, which are the carriers 
participating in alliances. In order to maintain the same criteria applied to the load 
factors, the same seven regions will be considered instead of continents: Asia-
Pacific, Europe, North America, Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The sixth 
variable measures the percentage of inter-regional flights and the effect is 
expected to be positive for the reasons mentioned above.  
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The seventh variable accounts for the concentration in the airport, measured by 
the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index. The expectation is a positive effect, since in the event 
of presence of concentration, it is to assume that it will happen among the hub alliance’s 
members, particularly the hub airline. A higher market share of the hub airline will lead 
to a higher market share of the alliance but also to a higher concentration in the airport. 
The market share of low-cost carriers is also considered. An empirical study by 
Fageda (2014) demonstrated that “network airlines at their hubs reduce frequencies when 
the share of low-cost airlines increases both on the route and at the hub”. The author 
added that “the increasing presence of low-cost airlines in European hub airports has 
negative consequences for the networking airlines that have traditionally dominated those 
hubs”. It is to expect that, despite of the study only focusing on the European market, the 
results can be generalized to other airports. Adding to this, the mutual exclusivity 
characteristic of the market shares suggests that if the share of low-cost carriers is higher, 
then the market shares of the other airlines will be lower. For these reasons, this variable 
is expected to have negative effect.  
A second dummy variable is introduced to signalize when the hub airline has 
multiple hubs. The multi-hub strategy decreases the network effect and the density 
economies. However, the hub airline might be forced to schedule frequent flights between 
the multiple hubs, thus increasing the number of alliance’s flights. For that reason, the 
effect is unknown. 
The tenth explanatory variable is the number of years the hub airline has been 
participating in the alliance. This variable was suggested by the proposal by Huettinger 
(2013) that the integration of an airline in an alliance is progressive and happens over a 
period of time. The author compares the integration in an alliance to the three components 
of integration in the European Union: widening, deepening and enlarging. According to 
this theory, it is expected that integration and cooperation increase over the years of 
participation in an alliance, enabling airlines to reap more benefits from it. This justifies 
a possible positive effect of this variable.  
The last variable is a third dummy variable that indicates whether there is a 
secondary airport in the same city as the airport analyzed.12 When a secondary airport 
                                                     
12 Military airports were not considered as secondary, since they are not used for civil flights. 
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exists, low-cost and regional airlines will tend to use them since “low-cost airlines 
avoid congested and expensive primary airports” in order to reduce expenditures 
on airport charges on reduce turnaround times (Pels, 2008). Taking this into 
consideration, it is to assume that the existence of a secondary airport will increase 
the market share of network airlines and decrease the share of low-cost carriers, 
thus leading to a positive effect of this variable.  
Other possible variables were considered but unfortunately ruled out for 
lack of available information. These were the existence of alliance terminal co-
location and the system of distribution of slots.  
Alliance terminal co-location aims at facilitating intra-alliance 
connections by making it easier and faster to transfer from different flights from 
the same alliance (Wu and Lee, 2014). This strategy improves the network effect 
and enhances the alliance traffic. The distribution of slots can be made entirely by 
the airport, entirely by an independent national agency or anything in between. 
The definition of this system can affect the easiness of establishing contracts. 
Although some airports had these information publicly known, others did not. For 
this reason, the two variables had to be excluded from the econometric model. 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This sections aims at providing a descriptive analysis of the data 
comprising the econometric model. Descriptive statistics can be found in table 4. 
The data is comprised by 22 European airports, 16 from Asia-Pacific, 
seven North-American, six Middle-Eastern, six Latin American and three African. 
In terms of alliances, 24 airports are hubs for airlines from Star Alliance, 21 for 
SkyTeam and 15 for oneworld.  
Only 17 follow a multi-hub strategy, whereas 47 have airline-within-
airline strategies. In 40 cases there is a presence of a secondary airport. 
The maximum share of a hub alliance and airline is 93,56% (SkyTeam) 
and 88,12% (Aeroflot) respectively, in Moscow Sheremetyevo International 
Airport. The lowest share of an alliance is oneworld in Moscow Domodedovo 
Airport (35,56%), but the lowest share of an airline is Czech Airlines in Vaclav 
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Havel Airport Prague with only 23,21% market share. The average is 59,07% for the 
alliance and 51,53% for the airline.  
The number of codeshares per flight vary between 1,15 and 3,47. The percentage 
of domestic flights and inter-regional flights differ extensively. Domestic flights vary 
between zero flights in Beirut, Brussels, Doha, Ljubljana and Singapore, and 95,97% in 
Shenzhen. Inter-regional flights diverge from zero flights in Shanghai Hongqiao and 
Xiamen to 58,78% in Istanbul. 
 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
ShareAlliance 0,5907 0,9356 0,3556 0,1524 
ShareHubAirline 0,5153 0,8812 0,2321 0,1660 
AvgNonHubAlliances 0,0827 0,2008 0,0079 0,0493 
AinA 0,7833 1,0000 0,0000 0,4155 
Codeshares 2,1268 3,4705 1,1479 0,5870 
DomesticFlights 0,3945 0,9597 0,0000 0,3200 
InterRegionalFlights 0,1553 0,5878 0,0000 0,1248 
HHI 0,3253 0,7775 0,0814 0,1707 
LCCs 0,1199 0,4471 0,0024 0,1050 
MultiHubAirline 0,2833 1,0000 0,0000 0,4544 
NrYears 9,7333 18,0000 1,0000 5,6595 
SecondaryAirport 0,6667 1,0000 0,0000 0,4754 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics: Model 1 
 
The airports’ concentration varies between 0,08 and 0,78. It is important to state, 
however, that 18 airports have moderate concentration and 36 present high levels of 
concentration.  Only in six airports concentration concerns do not occur: Brussels, 
Moscow Domodedovo, Prague, Shanghai Pudong, Singapore and Taipei. 
The airport with the highest presence of low-cost carriers is Kuala Lumpur, 
reaching 44,71%, while Panama City is the airport with lowest share of low-cost airlines 
with only 0,24%. In average, the analyzed airports have 11,99% of low-cost flights. 
In average, airlines have been participating in alliances for 9,73 years. TAM 
Linhas Aereas and SriLankan Airlines joined oneworld in 2014, whereas Air Canada, 
24 
 
Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines, Thai Airways International and United Airlines 
founded Star Alliance, therefore being part of an alliance for 18 years. 
 
4.4 Econometric Estimation 
Table 5 summarizes the regression results of the econometric model, 
where five out of eleven independent variables are found to be statistically 
significant: ShareHubAirline, AvgNonHubAlliances, DomesticFlights, LCCs and 
SecondaryAirport. The variables collectively explain 95% of the alliances’ market 
share in hub airports. The variables are found to be jointly significant. 
The coefficient of ShareHubAirline indicates that an increase of 1 
percentage point (from now on designated by pp) in the hub airline market share 
will lead to an increase of 0,7990 pp in the alliance market share. This corroborates 
the theory that “the provision of seamless connections through hub airports has 
played an important role in the upsurge of alliance traffic” (Wu and Lee, 2014) 
and the presence of network effects. There is a very tight relationship between the 
two variables, as will be discussed later.  
AvgNonHubAirlines is negatively related to the alliance market share, 
meaning that when there is an increase of the market share of other alliances, the 
market share of the hub alliance will decrease. An increase of 1 pp in other 
alliances’ market share leads to a decrease of 0,3025 pp in the dependent variable.  
As expected, DomesticFlights is also negatively related to the dependent 
variable. When the percentage of domestic flights increases by 1 pp, the market 
share of the hub alliance decreases 0,0607 pp. The coefficient thus present a small 
but statistically significant effect. This corroborates the theory that network 
airlines are not as concerned with domestic flights, leaving these flights to regional 
and low-cost airlines.  
The market share of low-cost carriers, measured by LCCs, is found to be 
negatively related to the market share of the alliance. An increase of 1 pp in the 
market share of low-cost airlines will decrease 0,2126 pp in the dependent 
variable.  
The last statistically significant variable is the only one that does not match 
the expectations formulated prior to the econometric estimation. 
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SecondaryAirport is negatively related to the dependent variable, whereas a positive 
effect was expected. This means that the market share of alliances is higher in cases where 
there is no secondary airport. No justification for the negative effect was found in the 
reviewed literature 
No expectations were formulated for the variables Codeshares and 
MultiHubAirline since two opposite effects could occur in both situations. The positive 
effect of Codeshares suggest that the network effects brought by codesharing strategies 
have greater impact. The positive effect of MultiHubAirline supports the theory that the 
number of flights between the multiple hubs increase the number of flights of the alliance. 
However, these variables are not considered statistically significant, consequently their 
interpretation requires caution.  
 
Variable Estimate 
Constant 0,2594*** 
ShareHubAirline 0,7990*** 
AvgNonHubAlliances -0,3025** 
AinA -0,0081 
Codeshares 0,0161 
DomesticFlights -0,0607** 
InterRegionalFlights -0,0869 
HHI -0,0060 
LCCs -0,2126*** 
MultiHubAirline 0,0023 
NrYears -0,0003 
SecondaryAirport -0,0236* 
R2 0,9544 
Joint Significance 91,2505** 
Table 5 Coefficients for the regression model: Model 113 
 
The tight relationship found between the dependent variable ShareAlliance and 
the explanatory variable ShareHubAirline raised the need to analyze the correlations 
                                                     
13 Statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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matrix, which can be found in Table 6. As stated by Pearson (1915), “the 
correlation ratio enabled the measure of relationship between two variables to be 
expressed by a single number, measuring its total intensity”. High levels of 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables may distort the 
results and lead to exaggerated R2 values. Reviewing the value for R2 from Model 
1, it is possible to verify that the value is indeed considerably high (95,44%).  
 
Variable Correlations Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ShareAlliance 1                       
2 ShareHubAirline 0,957 1                     
3 AvgNonHubAlliances -0,592 -0,559 1                   
4 AinA 0,036 0,133 0,189 1                 
5 Codeshares 0,100 0,076 -0,013 0,132 1               
6 DomesticFlights -0,087 0,019 0,142 0,278 -0,007 1             
7 InterRegionalFlights 0,411 0,405 -0,307 0,010 -0,003 -0,490 1           
8 HHI 0,907 0,971 -0,505 0,147 0,013 0,118 0,343 1         
9 LCCs -0,510 -0,464 -0,015 -0,080 0,022 -0,125 -0,281 -0,431 1       
10 MultiHubAirline -0,126 -0,060 0,127 0,241 0,090 0,642 -0,264 0,023 -0,021 1     
11 NrYears 0,114 0,119 0,056 0,090 0,589 0,041 -0,087 0,080 -0,063 -0,036 1   
12 SecondaryAirport -0,130 -0,023 0,162 0,315 0,234 0,152 0,009 0,020 0,047 0,131 0,218 1 
Table 6 Correlations matrix: Model 1 
 
Examining the correlations matrix, it is verifiable that the correlation ratio 
between the variables ShareAlliance and ShareHubAirline represents a high 
correlation ratio of 0,957. The variable HHI also exhibits high correlation with the 
dependent variable (0,907). However, the high correlation with this variable is 
justified by the relationship with ShareHubAirline since a higher market share of 
the hub airline justifies higher levels of concentration. The variables 
AvgNonHubAlliances, InterRegionalFlights and LCCs display moderate levels, 
whereas the other six variables present low correlation with the dependent 
variable.  
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Analyzing the correlation ratios between the explanatory variables, some 
interesting conclusions can be drawn.  
As stated above, the high level of correlation between ShareAlliance and HHI is 
explained by the high correlation between ShareHubAirline and the concentration in the 
market, which reaches a ratio of 0,971. The level of concentration is also correlated, 
although in a moderate level, with the average of the market shares of other alliances (-
0,505) and the market share of low-cost airlines, with a ratio of -0,431. All three 
correlations are easily understood, since a higher market share of a single airline will lead 
to a more concentrated market, whereas a stronger presence by other airlines (whether 
they participate in other alliances or pursue a low-cost strategy) will decrease the 
concentration in the airport.  
The variables MultiHubAirline and DomesticFlights have a moderate correlation 
ratio of 0,642. This relationship implies that when an airline follows a multi-hub strategy, 
the airport has a higher percentage of domestic flights. This suggests that this strategy 
require frequent flights between the multiple hubs, hence increasing the number of 
domestic flights, as was suggested earlier.   
DomesticFlights is understandably negatively correlated with the percentage of 
inter-regional flights in the airport, since they are mutually exclusive.  
Corroborating the theory suggested by Huettinger (2013) that the alliance 
engagement is gradual and cooperation between alliance’s members follows a 
strengthening process, the correlation ratio between Codeshares e NrYears is moderately 
positive. This means that the number of codeshares in the airports is higher when the hub 
airline has been participating in the alliance for a longer period of time, meaning that the 
integration on the alliance increases over time. 
Pels (2008) stated that “long-haul low-cost flights are not feasible”, since the 
characteristics of the low-cost business does not support intercontinental flights. This is 
justified by three main reasons: the inability to use a single aircraft strategy, the need to 
use primary airport and the higher turnaround times. The negative correlation ratio, 
although not very substantial, between the variables LCCs and InterRegionalFlights 
seems to corroborate that theory by implying that a higher number of inter-regional flights 
means a lower market share of low-cost airlines.  
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In order to eliminate the correlation problem identified above between 
ShareAlliance and ShareHubAirline, a second econometric model was developed. 
 
4.5 Alternative Econometric Specification 
In order to avoid the correlation problem, in the alternative model the 
dependent variable will be ShareAlliance – ShareHubAirline. Therefore, this 
model will be an assessment whether there are factors that contribute to a higher 
market share of an alliance, without the consideration of the market share of hub 
airline.  
The econometric specification can be found in the equation 4.2.  
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼9𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛼11𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
As mentioned, the dependent variable in this formulation is the market 
share of the dominant alliance without the market share of the dominant airline on 
airport i. Since one variable was included in the dependent variable, the model has 
now ten independent variables.  
The anticipated effects are similar to the expectations formulated for the 
first model in chapter 4.2 in most variables. Therefore, InterRegionalFlights, 
NrYears and SecondaryAirport are expected to have positive effects, whereas 
negative effects are anticipated for AvgNonHubAlliances, DomesticFlights and 
LCCs. The effects of the variables Codeshares and MultiHubAirline are also 
uncertain, as were in the first model. The arguments that motivate these 
expectations are the same that justified them in the first model.  
The expectations were altered for only two variables: AinA and HHI. The 
existence of an AinA strategy feeds the hub airline’s traffic and allows it to 
maintain majority market share in most traffics. Therefore, the existence of this 
(4.2) 
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strategy has a positive effect on ShareHubAirline. A negative effect on the dependent 
variable is to be expected. 
Higher levels of concentration are largely justified by a higher market share of the 
hub airline. A lower value of the dependent variable means that the market share of the 
hub airline is higher, thus leading to a more concentrated market Therefore, a less 
concentrated market occur when the dependent variable is higher, thus justifying an 
expected negative effect of the variable HHI.  
As can be verified in table 7, the correlation problems between the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables were removed. In this alternative model, the 
highest correlation is with the variable HHI with only a moderate correlation ratio of 
0,475. This means that the high correlation between ShareAlliance and HHI in the first 
model was effectively justified by the relationship between the concentration and the 
market share of the hub airline, as suggested at the time. 
 
Variable Correlations Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 
ShareAlliance-
ShareHubAirline 
1                     
2 AvgNonHubAlliances 0,055 1                   
3 AinA -0,344 0,189 1                 
4 Codeshares 0,055 -0,013 0,132 1               
5 DomesticFlights -0,336 0,142 0,278 -0,007 1             
6 InterRegionalFlights -0,095 -0,307 0,010 -0,003 -0,490 1           
7 HHI -0,475 -0,505 0,147 0,013 0,118 0,343 1         
8 LCCs -0,013 -0,015 -0,080 0,022 -0,125 -0,281 -0,431 1       
9 MultiHubAirline -0,193 0,127 0,241 0,090 0,642 -0,264 0,023 -0,021 1     
10 NrYears -0,050 0,056 0,090 0,589 0,041 -0,087 0,080 -0,063 -0,036 1   
11 SecondaryAirport -0,332 0,162 0,315 0,234 0,152 0,009 0,02 0,047 0,131 0,218 1 
Table 7 Correlations matrix: Model 2 
 
The assignable correlations between the explanatory variables are identical to the 
first model since no alterations were made to the remaining variables. 
The descriptive analysis is also similar to the preliminary model. The only 
modifications are the statistics related to the dependent variable, as is observable in table 
30 
 
8. The variable ShareAlliance – ShareHubAirline varies between 0,00% and 
21,60%. The minimum is obtained in Aeroparque Jorge Newbery, where 
Aerolineas Argentinas transported all passengers from SkyTeam in the considered 
period. The maximum is achieved in Brussels Airport, where Star Alliance 
accounts for 56,28% with only 34,68% being transported by Brussels Airlines, its 
hub airline. The average market share is 7,54%.  
 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
ShareAlliance - ShareHubAirline 0,0754 0,2160 0,0000 0,0485 
AvgNonHubAlliances 0,0827 0,2008 0,0079 0,0493 
AinA 0,7833 1,0000 0,0000 0,4155 
Codeshares 2,1268 3,4705 1,1479 0,5870 
DomesticFlights 0,3945 0,9597 0,0000 0,3200 
InterRegionalFlights 0,1553 0,5878 0,0000 0,1248 
HHI 0,3253 0,7775 0,0814 0,1707 
LCCs 0,1199 0,4471 0,0023 0,1050 
MultiHubAirline 0,2833 1,0000 0,0000 0,4544 
NrYears 9,7333 18,0000 1,0000 5,6595 
SecondaryAirport 0,6667 1,0000 0,0000 0,4754 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics: Model 2 
 
The regression results of the econometric estimation can be found in table 
9. In this alternative model, six out of ten variables are statistically significant and 
the variables are jointly significant.  
The independent variables collectively explain 54% of the alliances’ 
market share in hub airports without the hub airline, suffering a substantial 
decrease relative to the first model. However, this decrease is related to the 
resolution of the correlation problem, thus being a desirable reduction. 
AvgNonHubAlliances, DomesticFlights, LCCs and SecondaryAirport are 
statistically significant as were is the first model, whereas InterRegionalFlights 
and HHI became significant. The market share of other alliances and the existence 
of a secondary airport were statistically significant at a 5% level in the first model, 
however both are now only significant at a 10% level. The percentage of domestic 
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flights and the market share of low-cost carriers remained significant at a 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
The interpretation of the variables that are statistically significant in both 
econometric models are analogous to the analysis in chapter 4.4. The difference is the 
value of the coefficient, since all became less influential. 
The variable InterRegionalFlights does not correspond to the expectations 
formulated prior to the estimation. While a positive effect was expected, a negative effect 
was estimated. An increase of 1 pp in the percentage of inter-regional flights will lead to 
a decrease of 0,0900 pp in the dependent variable. No justification for this effect was 
found in the reviewed literature. 
As expected, the variable HHI exhibits a negative relationship with the dependent 
variable. An increase of the concentration of the airport creates a decrease on the 
dependent variable since, as suggested before, that raise in concentration is typically 
associated with a higher market share of the hub airline. 
 
Variable Estimate 
Constant 0,2090*** 
AvgNonHubAlliances -0,2318* 
AinA -0,0117 
Codeshares 0,0127 
DomesticFlights -0,0547** 
InterregionalFlights -0,0900* 
HHI -0,1773*** 
LCCs -0,1846*** 
MultiHubAirline 0,0052 
NrYears -0,0005 
SecondaryAirport -0,0209* 
R2 0,5357 
Joint Significance 5,6538*** 
Table 9 Coefficients for the regression model: Model 2
14 
 
                                                     
14 Statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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4.6 Parameter stability 
The model, as estimated, assumes that the coefficients of the regression 
model are the same for all observations. However, that might not be the case. What 
guarantees that airlines from oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance have the same 
characteristics? What ensures that an European and an Asian carrier behave 
similarly? If they are in fact unalike, then a specification error occurred.  
The objective of this section is to evaluate whether subsamples exist in 
order to dismiss possible specification errors. Two possible kinds of subsamples 
were identified: alliances and regions. The assessment of parameter stability will 
be conducted using the Gujarati Method as described by Mendes de Oliveira et al. 
(2011) and exposed in Appendix 1. The analysis will be based on the alternative 
econometric model, as defined in equation 4.2.  
The application of the Gujarati Method to the three alliances confirmed the 
existence of parameter stability. This means that there is no recognizable 
difference in the behavior of airlines from oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance 
Therefore, there is no specification error based on the lack of specification of the 
alliance. 
The application of the test to the six regions required some caution. 
Although there are sufficient observations from Europe and Asia-Pacific (22 and 
16, respectively), the other regions have very few observations, varying from three 
in Africa to seven in North America. For that reason, only two tests were made: 
Europe and Asia-Pacific. 
 
 Value Df Probability 
Alliance 
Star Alliance 1,0114 (11, 38) 0,4551 
SkyTeam 0,8777 (11, 38) 0,5689 
oneworld 1,3589 (11, 38) 0,2320 
Region 
Europe 1,6489 (11, 38) 0,1241 
Asia-Pacific 1,9013 (11, 38) 0,0704 
Table 10 F-Statistics for Gujarati Method 
 
Analyzing table 10, parameter stability is witnessed for the European 
subsample. Observations from Asia-Pacific suffer a structural breach at a 10% 
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level of significance, which is not very high but still requires the estimation of two new 
econometric models aiming at distinguish between airports from Asia-Pacific (with 16 
observations) and airports not from Asia-Pacific, with 44 observations. 
Table 11 summarizes the estimated coefficients for the regression model for both 
subsamples and compares the results with the ones from the second model, formulated in 
equation 4.2 and presented in Table 9.  
 
Variable Model 2 Asia-Pacific Not Asia-Pacific 
Constant 0,2090*** 0,2549*** 0,1698*** 
AvgNonHubAlliances -0,2318* 0,0421 -0,3976** 
AinA -0,0117 -0,0973* -0,0030 
Codeshares 0,0127 0,0118 0,0297** 
DomesticFlights -0,0547** -0,0566 -0,0581* 
InterRegionalFlights -0,0900* -0,0237 -0,1012* 
HHI -0,1773*** -0,2232** -0,1551*** 
LCCs -0,1846*** -0,1727 -0,1050 
MultiHubAirline 0,0052 0,0451 -0,0157 
NrYears -0,0005 -0,0023 -0,0005 
SecondaryAirport -0,0209* -0,0019 -0,0225* 
R2 0,5357 0,9292 0,6352 
Joint Significance 5,6538*** 6,5590** 5,7456*** 
Observations 60 16 44 
Table 11 Coefficients for the regression model after Gujarati Method15 
 
The results for the Asia-Pacific subsample are substantially different from the 
original model. The variables AvgNonHubAlliances, DomesticFlights, 
InterRegionalFlights, LCCs and SecondaryAirport are no longer statistically significant. 
The variable HHI is now statistically significant at 5% level and its effect increased.  
The variable AinA¸ that until now was not found statistically significant, is now 
significant for this sub-sample. The existence of an AinA strategy is negatively related to 
the dependent variable, as expected, meaning that the occurrence of this strategy leads to 
                                                     
15 Statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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a decrease of 0,0973 pp in the market share of the alliance without the hub airline. 
Lin (2012) stated that “in the US and EU markets, the AinA strategy has not been 
very successful” but “some major carriers in the Asia-Pacific region have 
succeeded at the strategy”. The failure of this strategy in the American and 
European regions and its success in Asia-Pacific justifies why the variable AinA 
is only statistically significant for the Asia-Pacific subsample. 
The econometric model for the subsample Asia-Pacific was the only one 
not jointly significant at a 1% level, while still achieving a 5% level. It is important 
to state that this regression model has very few observations, with only 5 degrees 
of freedom. So, its results can possibly be inadequate.  
The coefficient results of the regression model for the subsample Not Asia-
Pacific are similar to the original model. There are also six statistically significant 
variables, however LCCs is not significant, whereas Codeshares is.  
No expectations were formulated for the variable Codeshares since two 
opposite effects competed. However, the estimation exhibited a positive 
relationship between the dependent variable and this explanatory variable, 
meaning that the network effect caused by the formation of codeshares that leads 
to new flights by the codesharing airlines surpasses the possibility of decrease of 
flights.  
 This concludes the Part Two of the analysis. 
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5. Airports’ Response Strategies 
 
The reduction of market power led airports to react and modify their strategies in 
order to guarantee their survival. As stated by Bush and Starkie (2014) “most airports are 
likely to face competitive constraints from a number of different sources, stemming from 
the increased choice now available to both airlines and passengers”.  
Four main strategies were identified as responses to this recent instability. The 
first is the decrease of aeronautical charges. The second is the celebration of contracts 
with airlines. The third is the establishment of airports’ loyalty programs. The last is the 
development of an e-commerce strategy.  
The first strategy was already mentioned in the course of this thesis. Airlines face 
a fierce price competition, consequently pressuring airports to reduce aeronautical 
charges. The decrease of airports’ bargaining power led to an effective reduce of 
aeronautical charges in order to attract more airlines, turning the aeronautical business 
into a low-margin activity. By encouraging more airlines to operate in their infrastructure, 
airports are more attractive to passengers. This strategy led to airports being considered 
multi-product entities, as will be developed later, and increasing the commercial 
revenues. While aeronautical activities are subject to regulation, commercial operations 
are typically unregulated, further creating incentives for cross-subsidization. 
Many authors emphasized the importance of the celebration of contracts between 
airports and airlines. Faced with the instability created by the recent increase of airlines’ 
flexibility, airport started offering “discount charges in return for long term commercial 
contracts in order to try and establish a more stable environment” (Starkie, 2012). These 
contracts are characterized by airports offering operational and financial advantages in 
trade for operational commitment from the airline. Airport side obligations are usually 
discounts in charges, guarantee of quality of services, minimum turnaround times and 
staged investment. Airlines commit to an agreed minimum passenger volumes and 
number of aircrafts based at the airport. Entering a cooperative relationship, airports and 
airlines can more successfully compete with other airports-airlines pairs (D’Alfonso and 
Nastasi, 2014). 
Loyalty programs were recently developed by some airports with the objective of 
encouraging passenger spending by offering rewards, benefits and exclusive services. 
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This strategy further develops the commercial operations of airports and reduces 
the dependence on aeronautical revenues. Some examples are Heathrow Rewards 
at London Heathrow Airport, ViaMilano Program at Milano Malpensa Airport, 
CPH Advantage at Copenhagen Airport and Changi Rewards at Singapore Changi 
Airport.  
Another recent trend for airport business is the development of e-
commerce strategies. Bracaglia et al. (2014) stated that “empirical evidence shows 
that e-commerce is a growing trend in airport management”, in order to raise 
passengers’ switching costs and address the lack of customer loyalty as well as to 
“reduce the time lag between the purchase of airport ticket and the purchase of 
commercial services”.  
All these strategies deepens the commercial business of airports and 
increases the interdependence between airlines and passengers, further justifying 
the consideration of airports as two-sided markets or platforms. As Ivaldi et al. 
(2015) stated “airlines prefer to operate at airports which are attractive to 
passengers and passengers enjoy airports where they can access more air links and 
destinations, as well as a wide range of shops and restaurants, and convenient 
parking and transportation facilities”. The authors presented three features that 
characterize airports as two-sided platforms. The first is serving distinct products 
in each market, confirmed by airports providing aeronautical services to airlines 
and non-aeronautical services to passengers. The second is the relationship 
between the users’ benefits on one market and the performance of the other 
market, since “an airport is more valuable to airlines if it is popular with the 
passengers, and the passengers value the airport more when they can find a flight 
schedule closer to their desired departure time or which is better in saving their 
travel time”, a description of the interdependence between airlines and passengers. 
The last is being price setters on both sides. The mentioned authors found 
evidences that support the establishment of profit-maximizing prices for 
passengers and Ramsey prices16 for airlines. 
                                                     
16 Ramsey prices maximize social welfare while maintaining profit.  
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With the realization of the instability faced, the lack of bargaining power and the 
opportunity provided by commercial operations, airports have started to give increasing 
importance to non-aeronautical activities. The mentioned strategies aim at reducing tariffs 
charged to airlines and develop the commercial business of airports by attracting more 
airlines, increasing the number of passengers and their loyalty. Ivaldi et al. (2015) found 
evidences that some airports are not internalizing the network externalities resulting from 
the interdependence between airlines and passengers. Therefore, airports would benefit 
from establishing their business model as two-sided markets and pricing their services 
accordingly.  
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Conclusion 
 
The airline business has shifted dramatically in the last years with the 
deregulation process and consequent open-skies policies, the privatization of 
airports and airlines and the widespread use of the internet. These changes 
substantially altered the market dynamics by giving airlines more flexibility, 
raising airport competition and leading to the establishment of low-cost strategies 
and international airline alliances. 
Benefits of airline alliances to the allied airlines and to passengers were 
highlighted, however arguments against the acceptance of alliances were found 
for damages against non-allied airlines, passengers and airports. 
Arguments were found in the reviewed literature that suggest that airports 
suffered a loss of bargaining power following the creation of international airline 
alliances. 
In order to understand how the alliances’ market shares in hub airports are 
structured, an analysis was conducted. The Part One of the analysis showed how 
diverse are the alliances’ market shares, which consequently lead to the Part Two 
of the analysis, where it was studied what determines the hub alliance’s market 
share in hub airports by recurring to a linear regression model. 
Part Two provided evidences that the variables measuring the market 
shares of other alliances, the percentage of domestic and inter-regional flights, the 
concentration of the airport, the share of low-cost carriers and the existence of a 
secondary airports are statistically significant in determining the market share of 
the hub alliance. 
The Gujarati Method was used in order to understand whether subsamples 
existed. Parameter stability was found for all subsamples considered except for 
observations from Asia-Pacific, where structural break was found at a 10% level. 
Results from the subsample Not Asia-Pacific were similar to the original model, 
whereas results from airports from Asia-Pacific were quite diverse but unreliable 
due to the low number of observations. 
The realization of the loss of bargaining power led airports to resort to new 
strategies in order to attract airlines and passengers. Most airports decreased the 
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aeronautical charges, in order to attract more flights and increase the number of 
passengers, and celebrated contracts with airlines to guarantee stable environments. New 
tendencies include the establishment of loyalty programs and the development of e-
commerce strategies in order to further increase commercial revenues. These strategies 
are transforming airports into two-sided markets. 
Future research could improve the developed model by suppressing the limitations 
found relative to the data. The usage of annual data would allow to capture seasonal 
tendencies. A distinction of the load factors between allied, non-allied and low-cost 
carriers would also benefit the model since their differences are undeniable. The use of 
historical data would provide a comparison of the alliance’s market share in the hub 
airport before and after the hub airline joined the organization, thus providing an 
assessment of the effects brought by alliances. 
International airline alliance will continue to be a widely discussed strategy due 
to the risks identified. As stated by Adam Smith (1974), “people of the same trade seldom 
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”. Can airline alliances 
be the exception? 
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Appendix 1: Gujarati Method 
 
The Gujarati Method compares the model defined in equation 4.2 to a 
second formulation in which a dummy variable is included with additive and 
multiplicative properties. The dummy variable identifies whether the observation 
i is included in the defined subsample. 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼9𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛼11𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +  𝛿1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛿3 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿4𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛿6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿7𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿8𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛿9𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿10𝑁𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛿11𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
𝐷𝑖  = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑                 
 
 
The test compares the null hypothesis where δ1=δ2=…=δ11=0 to a situation 
where there is at least one coefficient not equal to zero, as described below. This 
implies an analysis of whether the initial model is improved by distinguishing if 
the observation participates or not in the subsample defined. If the null hypothesis 
is denied, then there is evidence of structural break. Otherwise, there is evidence 
of parameter stability.  
 
𝐻0: 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = ⋯ = 𝛿11 = 0 
𝐻1: ∃𝛿𝑗 ≠ 0, 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,11  
 
For clear understanding, an example will be provided related to the 
existence of parameter stability for airports in which Star Alliance is the hub 
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alliance. In this formulation, StarAlliance is a dummy variable that identifies when the 
hub airline at airport i is a member of Star Alliance. 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼9𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑁𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛼11𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛿2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿3 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿4𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛿5𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿7𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿8𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛿9𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿10𝑁𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒                 
 
 
This model is therefore comparing the behavior of airlines participating in Star 
Alliance with airlines not participating in Star Alliance, whether they are a member of 
SkyTeam or oneworld.  
 
 Value df Probability 
F-statistic 1,0114 (11, 38) 0,4551 
 
As can be witnessed above the ρ-value is 0,4551, therefore leading to verification 
of the null hypothesis. A conclusion of existence of parameter stability was achieved.  
This tests is conducted for all subsamples identified: Star Alliance, SkyTeam, 
oneworld, Europe and Asia-Pacific. 
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Annex 1: Alliances’ Members 
 
oneworld SkyTeam Star Alliance 
Air Berlin Aeroflot Adria Airways 
American Airlines Aerolíneas Argentinas Aegean Airlines 
British Airways Aeroméxico Air Canada 
Cathay Pacific Air Europa Air China 
Finnair Air France Air India 
Iberia Airlines Alitalia Air New Zealand 
Japan Airlines China Airlines All Nippon Airways 
LAN Airlines China Eastern Airlines Asiana Airlines 
Malaysia Airlines China Southern Airlines Austrian Airlines 
Qantas Czech Airlines Avianca 
Qatar Airways Delta Air Lines Brussels Airlines 
Royal Jordanian Garuda Indonesia Copa Airlines 
SriLankan Airlines Kenya Airways Croatia Airlines 
S7 Airlines KLM EgyptAir 
TAM Airlines Korean Air Ethiopian Airlines 
 Middle East Airlines EVA Air 
 Saudia LOT Polish Airlines 
 TAROM Lufthansa 
 Vietnam Airlines Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) 
 Xiamen Airlines Shenzhen Airlines 
  Singapore Airlines 
  South African Airways 
  
Swiss International Air Lines 
(SWISS) 
  TAP Portugal 
  Thai Airways International 
  Turkish Airlines 
  United Airlines 
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Annex 2: Aircrafts 
 
Aircraft Category Capacity Aircraft Category Capacity 
Fokker 100 Passenger 102 Boeing 767-300 Freighter Freighter 0 
British Aerospace 146-300 Passenger 100 Boeing 777 F Freighter 0 
British Aerospace 146 Passenger 82 Boeing 777-200LR Passenger 266 
Airbus Industrie A310 Passenger 220 Boeing 777-300ER Passenger 0 
Airbus Industrie A310-300 Passenger 222 Boeing 777-200F Freighter 389 
Airbus A318 Passenger 107 Antonov AN148-100 Passenger 77 
Airbus A319 Passenger 122 Airbus A300-600 Passenger 266 
Airbus A320 Passenger 150 Airbus A300 Freighter Freighter 0 
Airbus A321 Passenger 185 Airbus A300B4/A300C4/A300F4 Freighter 0 
Airbus A330 Passenger 273 Airbus Industrie A300-600 Freighter Freighter 0 
Airbus A330-200 Passenger 246 Antonov An-26/An-30/An-32 Freighter 0 
Airbus A330-300 Passenger 300 Avro RJ100 Passenger 97 
Airbus A330-400 Passenger 261 Avro RJ85 Passenger 95 
Airbus A340-200 Passenger 261 ATR 42-300/320 Passenger 46 
Airbus A340-300 Passenger 300 ATR 42-500 Passenger 46 
Airbus A340-500 Passenger 375 ATR 72 Passenger 70 
Airbus A340-600 Passenger 359 ATR 72 Freighter Freighter 0 
Airbus A380 Passenger 525 ATR 42 / ATR 72 Passenger 56 
Airbus A380-800 Passenger 470 ATR 42 Freighter Freighter 0 
Boeing 717-200 Passenger 106 Beech 1900 Airliner Passenger 19 
Boeing 737-200 Passenger 97 Beech 1900D Airliner Passenger 19 
Boeing 737-300 Passenger 140 Cessna (Light aircraft) Passenger 4 
Boeing 737-400 Passenger 140 
Cessna (Light aircraft - single turboprop 
engine) 
Passenger 4 
Boeing 737-500 Passenger 120 Cessna Citation Passenger 8 
Boeing 737-600 Passenger 110 Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet 200 Passenger 48 
Boeing 737-700 Passenger 118 Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet 700 Passenger 70 
Boeing 737-800 Passenger 162 Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet 900 Passenger 88 
Boeing 737-900 Passenger 167 Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet 705 Passenger 75 
Boeing 747-400 Passenger 416 
Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet 
Freighter 
Freighter 0 
Boeing 747 Passenger 375 Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet Passenger 50 
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Boeing 757-200 Passenger 200 
Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet 
1000 
Passenger 93 
Boeing 757-300 Passenger 220 Convair CV-580 Passenger 40 
Boeing 757 Passenger 275 Convair 580/5800/600/640 Freighter Freighter 0 
Boeing 767-200 Passenger 202 Fairchild Dornier 328-100 Passenger 78 
Boeing 767-300 Passenger 209 Boeing (Douglas) DC-9 Freighter Freighter 0 
Boeing 767-400 Passenger 235 Canadair (Bombardier) Regional Jet Freighter 0 
Boeing 767 Passenger 269 
De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-8-100 
Dash 8/8Q 
Passenger 36 
Boeing 777-200/200ER Passenger 266 
De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-8-200 
Dash 8/8Q 
Passenger 37 
Boeing 777-300 Passenger 398 
De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-8-300 
Dash 8/8Q 
Passenger 53 
Boeing 777 Passenger 400 
De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-8-400 
Dash 8/8Q 
Passenger 74 
Boeing 787 Passenger 242 
De Havilland (Bombardier) DHC-8 
Dash 8 
Passenger 53 
Boeing 787-800 Passenger 219 Embraer 170 Passenger 74 
Boeing 787-900 Passenger 252 Embraer 175 Passenger 80 
British Aerospace 146-100 Freighter Freighter 0 Embraer 190 Passenger 106 
Airbus Industrie A310 Freighter Freighter 0 Embraer 195 Passenger 116 
Airbus Industrie A310-300 Freighter Freighter 0 Embraer 120 Passenger 30 
Airbus A320 (sharklets) Passenger 168 Embraer RJ170/190 Passenger 70 
Airbus A321 (sharklets) Passenger 215 Embraer RJ135 Passenger 37 
Airbus A318/319/320/321 Passenger 215 Embraer RJ145 Passenger 45 
Airbus Industrie A330 Freighter Freighter 0 Embraer RJ140 Passenger 44 
Airbus A330-200 Freighter Freighter 0 Embraer RJ135/RJ140/RJ145 Passenger 42 
Boeing 727 Freighter Freighter 0 Fokker F28 Fellowship Passenger 65 
Boeing 727-200 Freighter Freighter 0 Fokker 50 Passenger 50 
Boeing 737-300 (winglets) Passenger 144 Fokker 70 Passenger 80 
Boeing 737-500 (winglets) Passenger Passenger 120 Fairchild 328JET Passenger 33 
Boeing 737 Freighter Freighter 0 Ilyushin II-76 Freighter 0 
Boeing 737-700 Passenger 135 Ilyushin II-96 Passenger 262 
Boeing 737-800 (winglets) Passenger 162 British Aerospace Jetstream 31 Passenger 19 
Boeing 737-900 (winglets) Passenger 167 British Aerospace Jetstream 32 Passenger 30 
Boeing 737-200 Mixed Configuration Passenger 50 British Aerospace Jetstream 41 Passenger 30 
Boeing 737-700 (winglets) Passenger 141 Boeing (Douglas) MD-11 Freighter Freighter 0 
Boeing 737-300 Freighter Freighter 0 Boeing (Douglas) MD-80 Passenger 155 
Boeing 747-400 Mixed Configuration Mixed 264 Boeing (Douglas) MD-82 Passenger 152 
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Boeing 747-400F Freighter 0 Boeing (Douglas) MD-83 Passenger 155 
Boeing 747-8 Passenger 467 Boeing (Douglas) MD-88 Passenger 152 
Boeing 747SP Passenger Passenger 250 Boeing (Douglas) MD-90 Passenger 153 
Boeing 747 Mixed Configuration Passenger 359 Pilatus PC-12 Passenger 6 
Boeing 747-8F Freighter Freighter 0 Saab 2000 Passenger 54 
Boeing 747-400 Freighter Freighter 0 Saab 340 Passenger 34 
Boeing 757-200 Freighter Freighter 0 Saab 340B Passenger 34 
Boeing 757-300 (winglets) Passenger 219 Shorts 360 (SD3-60) Passenger 39 
Boeing 757-200 (winglets) Passenger 200 Sukhoi Superjet 100-95 Passenger 98 
Boeing 767 Freighter Freighter 0 Tupolev Tu-204 / Tu-214 Passenger 210 
Boeing 767-300 (winglets) Passenger 209 Yakovlev Yak-42 / Yak-142 Passenger 110 
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Annex 3: Airports and Hub Airlines 
 
IATA 
Code 
Airport Hub Airline Category 
ADD Addis Ababa Bole International Airport Ethiopian Airlines African 
AEP Aeoparque Jorge Newberry Aerolineas Argentinas Latin American 
AKL Auckland Airport Air New Zealand Asia-Pacific 
AMM Amman Queen Alia International Airport Royal Jordanian Middle Eastern 
AMS Amsterdam Airport Schiphol KLM European 
ATH Athens International Airport Aegean Airlines European 
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport Delta Air Lines North American 
BEY Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport Middle East Airlines Middle Eastern 
BKK Suvarnabhumi Airport Thai Airways International Asia-Pacific 
BOG El Dorado International Airport Avianca Latin American 
BRU Brussels Airport Brussels Airlines European 
CAI Cairo International Airport EgyptAir Middle Eastern 
CAN Guangzhou Airport China Southern Airlines Asia-Pacific 
CDG Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport Air France European 
CMB Bandaranaike International Airport SriLankan Airlines Asia-Pacific 
CPH Copenhagen Airport SAS European 
DFW Dallas Fort Worth International Airport American Airlines North American 
DME Moscow Domodedovo Airport S7 Airlines European 
DOH Hamad International Airport Qatar Airways Middle Eastern 
DTW Detroit Metropolitan Airport Delta Air Lines North American 
DUS Düsseldorf Airport Air Berlin European 
FCO Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino Airport Alitalia European 
FRA Frankfurt Airport Lufthansa European 
GRU São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport TAM Linhas Aereas Latin American 
HAN Noi Bai International Airport Vietnam Airlines Asia-Pacific 
HEL Helsinki-Vantaa Airport Finnair European 
HND Haneda Airport International ANA Asia-Pacific 
IAH George Bush Intercontinental Airport United Airlines North American 
ICN Incheon International Airport Korean Air Asia-Pacific 
IST Istanbul Ataturk Airport Turkish Airlines Middle Eastern 
JED King Abdulaziz International Airport Saudia Middle Eastern 
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JNB OR Tambo International Airport South African Airways African 
KUL Kuala Lumpur International Airport Malaysia Airlines Asia-Pacific 
LHR London Heathrow Airport British Airways European 
LIS Lisbon Portela Airport TAP Portugal European 
LJU Ljubljana Jože Puĉnik Airport Adria Airways European 
MAD Madrid Barajas Airport Iberia European 
MEX Mexico City International Airport Aeromexico Latin American 
MIA Miami International Airport American Airlines North American 
NBO Nairobi-Jomo Kenyatta International Airport Kenya Airways African 
ORD Chicago O’Hare International Airport United Airlines North American 
OTP Henri Coandă International Airport TAROM European 
PEK Beijing Capital International Airport Air China Asia-Pacific 
PRG Vaclav Havel Airport Prague Czech Airlines European 
PTY Tocumen International Airport Copa Airlines Latin American 
PVG Shanghai Pudong International Airport China Eastern Airlines Asia-Pacific 
SCL Arturo Merino Benítez International Airport LAN Airlines Latin American 
SHA Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport China Eastern Airlines Asia-Pacific 
SIN Changi Airport Singapore Airlines Asia-Pacific 
SVO Sheremetyevo International Airport Aeroflot Europe 
SYD Sydney Airport Qantas Asia-Pacific 
SZX Shenzhen Bao’an International Airport China Southern Airlines Asia-Pacific 
TPE Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport China Airlines Asia-Pacific 
TXL Tegel Airport Berlin Air Berlin European 
VIE Vienna International Airport Austrian European 
WAW Warsaw Chopin Airport LOT Polish Airlines European 
XMN Xiamen Gaoqi International Airport Xiamen Airlines Asia-Pacific 
YYZ Toronto Pearson International Airport Air Canada North American 
ZAG Zagreb International Airport Croatia Airlines European 
ZRH Zürich Airport SWISS European 
 
 
